David Dellucci and the joy of splits

The Indians are about to sign outfielder David Dellucci to a contract, reported to be worth $11.5 million over three years. The deal is likely to be announced at the winter meetings once Dellucci passes a physical.

Dellucci, 32, is a left-handed hitting left fielder with a career line of .263/.348/.449, for a career OPS of 797. Dellucci has posted OPSs of 880 and 899 over the last two seasons with Texas and Philadelphia, hitting 42 homers in 699 at-bats (granted, in very homer-friendly parks) and posting OBPs of .367 and .369.

So what’s the catch? Why isn’t a hitter of Dellucci’s caliber getting a longer contract worth more money? Well, for one thing, Dellucci tends to hit a for a low batting average (.263 career), even though his OBP and SLG are stellar. More importantly, Dellucci has extreme platoon splits; in other words, he’s a MUCH better hitter against right-handed pitching than he is against lefties.

In 2006, when Dellucci had an OPS of 899, all but 20 of hit at-bats were against righties (incidentally, his OBP was .375 against righties, and .292 against lefties). In 2005, Dellucci had only 33 at-bats against lefties, and had a poor 706 OPS. From 2004-2006, Dellucci has 949 at-bats against righties, compared with 81 against lefties. His OPS is 875 against righties, but only 605 against lefties.

If only the Indians had another left fielder capable of hitting left-handed pitchers. He wouldn’t even have to be able to hit righties, Dellucci can take care of that. If only…

Jason Michaels’s 2006 season with the Indians looks pretty bad. Michaels posted a measly 717 OPS---bad for any hitter, but downright awful for a left fielder. However, this is misleading: Michaels was terrible against right-handed pitchers, managing only a .252/.312/.354 line, for an OPS of 666. However, against lefties Michaels hit .291/.341/.450, for an OPS of 799. The reason his overall OPS is only 717 is that Michaels had 305 at-bats against righties, while only 189 against lefties.

Furthermore, over the last three seasons, Michaels has an 829 OPS against lefties, including a .385 OBP (in 403 at-bats) and a 720 OPS against righties.

If used correctly, the combination of Jason Michaels (against lefties) and David Dellucci (against righties) in left-field is going to be a very productive hitter.

This got me thinking about platoon splits. The Indians have no set right fielder going into 2007 either. However, the candidates are fascinating, because of their platoon splits.

Shin-Soo Choo was solid in his debut with the Tribe. He seems to be a much better hitter against right-handed pitchers than against lefties. In the majors, his OPS was 836 against righties, as compared to 628 against lefties (granted, in only 18 at-bats). His minor league splits back this up further: in AAA Choo absolutely destroyed righties to the tune of .361/.433/.578 (that’s an OPS of 1.011, kids), while he struggled against lefties, batting only .192/.256/.218 (for an OPS of 474). Now that’s an extreme platoon split. If only there was another right-fielder Choo could platoon with…

Franklin Gutierrez’s 2006 season with Buffalo was encouraging, but not incredibly impressive. Gutierrez hit .278./.373/.433 with the Bisons, which is solid for a 23-year-old. He then stunk it up with the Indians in limited action. However, his platoon splits reveal something interesting: Gutierrez was much better against lefties than he was against righties. With Buffalo, Gutierrez hit .320/.413/.583 against righties (996 OPS) and only .269/.362/.378 against lefties (740 OPS).

Let’s review. Left-field candidates’ 3-year OPS splits:

Jason Michaels: 829 vs lefties, 720 vs righties

David Dellucci: 605 vs lefties, 875 vs righties

Right-field candidates’ 2006 AAA OPS splits (I cannot find more detailed minor league splits, unfortunately):

Shin-Soo Choo: 474 vs lefties, 1011 vs righties

Franklin Gutierrez: 996 vs lefties, 740 vs righties

A couple of caveats: 1) these numbers are taken from a fairly small sample size, especially Choo’s and Gutierrez’s, 2) past performance does not guarantee future success. Certainly helps, though.

It is likely that Casey Blake will get the majority of at-bats in right field. While this wouldn’t be a terrible thing, the Indians are better of letting Blake serve as a super-utility-man, playing right field, first base, and third base as needed, while letting Choo and Gutierrez split most of the at-bats in right field. Both Choo and Gutierrez are better outfielders than Blake, and their extreme success against either lefties or righties suggests that they could form a potent platoon.

The key now is for Eric Wedge to maximize his roster. I’m sure he’s well aware of these splits; he needs to manipulate game situations to benefit the Indians. If he is able to do this, and the four aforementioned players continue to have reasonable success as they have in the past, the Indians could have two very productive platoons to add to their already explosive lineup.

Analyzing Jeremy Sowers, Part III

It is quite likely that you are at least skeptical of Voros McCracken’s DIPS theory (or perhaps you simply don’t believe it). Perhaps Sowers is simply an exception, assuming the theory is even true on the first place.

One theory put forth as a possible explanation of “exceptions” to the DIPS theory is that pitchers who strike a lot of batters out might also be able to get lots of weakly hit balls that are easily converted into outs. Whether or not this is true, it surely does not relate to Sowers. Sowers’s stuff is barely even average. His fastball sits around 88, and he lacks any plus-plus pitches. Furthermore, his strikeout rates reflect this---in an at-bat, Sowers is not overwhelming a hitter with his stuff.

Sowers struck out only 3.57 batters per nine innings, a figure that ranks him third-to-last in all of baseball. The only pitchers who struck out fewer batters were Carlos Silva (who had a 5.94 ERA, a walk rate much lower than Sowers’s, and generated 30% more ground balls than fly balls) and Chien-Ming Wang (who survived on his ability to generate 306% more ground balls than fly balls).

Okay, so Jeremy Sowers is not a power pitcher. If you’ve ever seen him pitch, you don’t need me to tell you this. Perhaps we can compare him to other “crafty” or “finesse” pitchers who seem to thrive on getting weakly-hit balls. Greg Maddux, Tom Glavine, and Jamie Moyer come to mind as pitchers that fit this mold. In fact, I’ve even heard Sowers compared to Glavine. Here are their BABIPs for the last three seasons:

Maddux: .261, .299, .290

Glavine: .284, .288, .318

Moyer: .268, .296, .327

Fairly random, and once again, all higher than Sowers’s BABIP. Furthermore, despite his reputation of being “crafty”, Tom Glavine has struck out 5.38 batters per nine innings. Glavine’s career BABIP-against is .282. Although he does seem to be good at controlling balls that are put in to play, his BABIP is still significantly higher than Sowers’s. Maddux’s career BABIP is .283. Moyer’s is .284. All are very good. All are much higher than Jeremy Sowers’s .256 with the Indians, or .263 with Buffalo.

So what do we make of a pitcher who doesn’t strike anyone out and gives up far fewer hits than we expect him to? In short, he was lucky. The sample size was small, and over a longer period of time regression to the mean would occur, and Sowers’s ERA would be a lot higher. This might indeed be the case.

However, Sowers’s track record is still short. ERA aside, his 2005 and 2006 were very different years: he was legitimately excellent in 2005, striking out many, walking few, and giving up few homers. In 2006, he also gave up few homers, but he didn’t strike out as many and walked more.

Sowers will certainly survive on his command and control (yes, these are different). He’s likely an exception to the general rule that power pitchers are the best kind of pitchers. However, his apparent ability to prevent balls in play from becoming hits is at least somewhat of a fluke. Thus, in order to maintain success going forward, he will need to preserve his ability to prevent homers, and increase his ability to strike batters out. If he is able to do this, he will likely be a very good #3 starter in the majors, a guy who you can expect to pitch 200 innings and maintain an ERA of around 4.00-4.50 (perhaps a little bit better if he can really improve his K-rate).

However, because much of his 2006 was attributable to luck, Sowers is a prime candidate for the infamous Sophomore Slump, which, in actuality, is regression to the mean. His long-term prognosis is excellent, but I fear that expectations are going to be unjustly high for 2007.

Analyzing Jeremy Sowers, Part II

Before proceeding with my analysis of Jeremy Sowers, I would like to take a brief detour. One of the more interesting and controversial theories in sabermetrics was put forth by sabermetrician Voros McCracken. McCracken’s Defense Independent Pitchig Statistics (DIPS) theory suggests that “major-league pitchers don't appear to have the ability to prevent hits on balls in play.” In other words, pitchers can control whether they strike a batter out, walk a batter, or give up a home run; however, if the batter makes contact with the ball (but it remains in the park), the pitcher has no control over whether the batted ball becomes a hit or an out.

This makes sense intuitively on one level. How often do we see a hard-hit line-drive fall into a well-positioned fielder’s glove? How often do we see a weakly-hit blooper drop over the shortstop’s head? Surely there is some luck involved. However, to say that all pitchers do not have control over any batted balls does not make sense. Surely some pitchers can induce weakly-hit balls (which are then converted into outs) more often than other pitchers. Right?

Wrong. Pitchers are able to control strikeouts, walks, and home runs (as these tend to correlate strongly from one year to the next), but not hits allowed. McCracken suggests that the league average for BABIP (batting average on balls in play) is around .300, and any significant deviation from this figure is due mainly to luck. For individual pitchers, BABIP does not correlate from year-to-year. In other words, a pitcher’s BABIP in one season does not suggest or predict his BABIP next season.

McCracken’s theory has been written about a lot. The theory has also been tweaked a lot, but the general idea remains: pitchers cannot control whether balls in play become hits or outs.

With that theory out of the way, let’s continue with our evaluation of Sowers.

In 2005, Sowers was legitimately excellent. His overall K/BB ratio was an impressive 145/28 in 153 innings. He also gave up only 13 homers. In short, he did everything you hope a pitching prospect would do: he kept the ball in the yard, struck out almost one batter per inning, and walked virtually no one.

In 2006 Sowers’s ERA while at Buffalo was 1.39. No pitcher is this good, no matter who he is. Obviously, there was some luck involved to keep Sowers’s ERA at such a miniscule level. However, beyond that, Sowers’s indicators were very poor at Buffalo, especially in comparison to his stellar 2005 numbers.

Sowers struck out only 59 in 97 innings, a strikingly low figure of 4.99 strikeouts per nine innings. While this by itself is worrisome, Sowers’s excellent control seemingly worsened, leading to 29 walks (or 2.68 per nine innings). To his credit, he only gave up one home run, an excellent sign. So how did Sowers manage to post a 1.39 ERA? One thing really stands out: if you were going to get a hit against Sowers, it was going to be a single. Period. Opposing hitters slugged a paltry .287 against Sowers. For comparison’s sake, anemic-hitting Jason Tyner’s career slugging percentage is .315.

One of the reasons for this could be Sowers’s ability to generate ground balls. Pitchers who generate a lot of grounders (such as Chien-Ming Wang, Derek Lowe, Jake Westbrook, and Brandon Webb) tend to allow fewer extra-base hits, as ground balls cannot become homers, and rarely become anything other than singles. This might make sense, except for one little fact: Sowers is not a ground ball pitcher. In Buffalo, he allowed 156 ground balls and 137 fly balls. With the Indians, Sowers allowed more fly balls than ground balls.

Nonetheless, whether they were fly balls or ground balls, they weren’t finding holes when they were put in play. In Buffalo, Sowers’s BABIP was .263---meaning that 26.3% of the balls put into play became hits. That’s a low number, although not incredibly low. Let’s compare it to other starters on Buffalo; presumably they were playing in front of the same defense. Five other pitchers who started games for the Bisons (Rob Bell, Fausto Carmona, Jake Dittler, Jeremy Guthrie, and Jeremy Stanford) posted BABIPs of .284, .342, .321, .273 and .277, respectively. All higher than Sowers’s BABIP. Furthermore, the BABIP for all of the International League was .305.

To sum up: Sowers gave up an unusually low amount of hits; when he did give up hits, they were almost always singles. This is a good recipe for success; however, it does not suggest future success against better hitters at the major league level.

Sure enough, after giving up one homer to AAA hitters, Sowers surrendered 10 homers to MLB hitters in approximately the same amount of innings. His slugging-percentage-against rose to .392---still a low number, but much higher than he had given up at Buffalo. However, Sowers’s apparent ability to prevent balls in play from becoming hits persisted: his BABIP against was .256. The Indians’ defense was not good in 2006, witness the BABIPs of their other starters: .294, .322, .296, and .318 for Sabathia, Westbrook, Lee, and Byrd respectively.

Tomorrow I will finish my look at Jeremy Sowers by suggesting what this analysis means for the future. Was Sowers just REALLY lucky in 2006? Is he an exception to the DIPS “rule,” a la Tom Glavine or Jamie Moyer? (Hint: not even Glavine or Moyer are exceptions to the DIPS rule.)

Analyzing Jeremy Sowers, Part I

It’s too bad that Daisuke Matsuzaka will be considered a “rookie” in 2007; otherwise, Indians pitcher Jeremy Sowers would be a shoo-in for the Rookie of the Year award. Right?

Well, Delmon Young notwithstanding, not so fast. While Sowers’s 2006 performance gives hope to a bright 2007, his underlying indicators suggest otherwise. I will do my best to analyze Sowers and assess his prospects for the future.

Jeremy Sowers was selected by the Indians as the #6 overall pick in the 2004 draft. At the time, Sowers was viewed as a polished pitcher whose ceiling was not necessarily that of a #1 or #2 starter, but who had an excellent chance of being a solid major league pitcher. Beyond that, Sowers was not expected to need much more seasoning in the minor leagues.

Sowers soon proved that he was nearly a finished product. His began his professional career at age 22 in 2005 at High-A ball in Kinston, where he made 13 starts. Sowers had a 2.78 ERA and 75/19 K/BB ratio in 71 innings, giving up only 5 homers and 60 hits. His performance soon earned him a promotion to AA Akron, where his dominance continued. Sowers again made 13 starts, this time posting a 2.08 ERA and 70/9 K/BB ratio in 82 innings, whilst allowing only 8 homers and 74 hits.

Expectations were justifiably high for Sowers as the 2006 season began. He started the year with AAA Buffalo. Sowers made 15 starts at Buffalo, and posted a ridiculous 1.39 ERA in 97 innings (he allowed only 15 runs!). Sowers struck out 54, walked 29, allowed only one home run and gave up only 78 hits. His performance (and Jason Johnson’s terrible pitching) enabled the Indians to promote him to the big leagues.

With Cleveland in 2006, Sowers made 14 starts and finished with a 3.57 ERA in 88 innings. He struck out 35, walked 20, and gave up 10 homers and 85 hits. After the all-star break, Sowers’s ERA was a phenomenal 2.72, the second-best in the AL during this span (behind Johan Santana).

Tomorrow I will look at the underlying indicators of Sowers's performance, which suggest that we can attribute much of his success in 2006 to luck.

Trades are a two-way street

Most fantasy leagues have that one player who consistently makes annoying trade proposals. The trades are annoying because they’re always lopsided in his favor, but not blatantly so. Usually this type of deal involves him giving up three or four decent players in exchange for one superstar. The total production of the decent players may well exceed that of the star; nonetheless, it is still a lopsided deal which you would never accept.

Alas, these types of potential trades are not limited to fantasy baseball. Indeed, many fans---especially those of big market teams---like to believe that similar deals could occur in real life. Witness Mets fans consistently spouting the idea of packaging together spare parts that they don’t want (Lastings Milledge, Aaron Heilman, and a “prospect”) in hopes of obtaining Dontrelle Willis. Sorry, Mets fans: the Marlins can do a lot better if they want to trade Willis.

In this piece (cited by ESPN’s Buster Olney), the writer, John P Lopez, presents a logical, reasonable argument for why the Astros should not sign Carlos Lee. He illustrates a tough paradox that the Astros are facing: either they can choose not to sign Lee (probably a smart move) and continue to be called “cheap” or “not committed to the fans;” or they can sign Lee and likely waste a lot of money. This level of in depth thinking and recognition of the complication of issues is unusual for sports-writing.

However, Lopez then suggests that rather than sign Lee, the Astros should trade for Toronto’s Vernon Wells or Tampa Bay’s Carl Crawford. He makes the same argument that Mets fans make: let’s piece together several admittedly-pretty-good players Lopez suggests Jason Hirsh, Adam Everett, and Chris Burke) and offer them in exchange for a superstar. After all, the guys we’re giving up are pretty good. Who cares if they will suit the needs of the team receiving them?

I will probably return to this point other times, as it’s a personal gripe of mine, but I will say it once and for all: if you want to trade for a star player, you’re going to have to give up a lot of talent. If you feel comfortable offering a package of three players for a star without hesitation, then chances are this is not even CLOSE to a good enough package. If you really want to pry a player like Vernon Wells or Carl Crawford loose from their teams, you’re going to have to give up so much talent that it hurts.

In order to receive Josh Beckett (and Mike Lowell, the “salary dump” who outperformed Beckett last year), the Red Sox gave up the 2006 NL Rookie of the Year, a rookie pitcher who threw a no-hitter, and another two prospects who struck out more than one batter per inning in the minors. Yes, this is an extreme example, considering how quickly the players the Marlins received became good (as well as how poorly Beckett pitched). However, this is the type of trade “big-market” teams are going to have to expect to make if they want to get stars from small-market teams---especially if those stars aren’t too expensive (this is especially true in the case of Carl Crawford---his contract is affordable by anyone’s standards, even Tampa Bay’s. They have no NEED to trade him).

Not that this is necessarily a bad thing for your team; after all, to get good players you have to give up good players. But you cannot hope to throw together several “pretty-good” players and hope it’s enough to get you one star player. Just like in fantasy baseball, trades don’t work like that.

Matsuzaka Math

The Boston Red Sox spent more money for the right to try to sign Daisuke Matsuzaka than the Royals, Pirates, Rockies, Devil Rays, and Marlins spent on their entire 25-man rosters in 2006.

Furthermore, Matsuzaka himself has not received one cent of the money; his agent, Scott Boras, will seek to extract every nickel from the Red Sox’s already-depleted pockets.

How can this possibly work out well for the Red Sox? I would argue that winning the rights to Matsuzaka---even at such an exorbitant sum of money---is a smart decision for the Red Sox. Here’s why.

Let’s assume, for argument’s sake, that the Red Sox sign Matsuzaka to a contract. Both the Sox front office and Scott Boras (and, by extension, Matsuzaka himself) have too much to lose by simply walking away. While both sides could potentially have a lot of leverage should they choose to play hard-ball, it is unlikely that Matsuzaka will return to Japan next season. Thus, the sides will come to a reasonable (if you can call salaries in baseball “reasonable”) deal before their deadline.

As such, it’s likely that, when all is said and done, the Red Sox will end up spending around $100 million on Matsuzaka, including the posting fee and his contract, which likely will be for no longer than 5 years. How can this possibly make sense?

First of all, there is the baseball aspect of this deal. From all accounts, Matsuzaka is one of the “best 5-10 pitchers on the planet” according to Keith Law. A conservative estimation is that Matsuzaka would rank amongst the top dozen American League starters (Kenny Rogers and Nate Robertson tied for 11^th best AL ERAs in 2006, with a 3.94 figure). However, it’s much more likely, as evidenced HERE, that Matsuzaka will be better than that. His 2005 Japanese League statistics were translated into their Major League equivalents by more than one person, and each came up with approximately a 3.40 ERA (see THIS and THIS). That would have ranked fourth in the AL, behind CC Sabathia and ahead of Mike Mussina.

Matsuzaka is likely to be a legitimate #1 starter---a workhorse who will post one of the best ERAs in the league. He will complement the Red Sox’s staff perfectly. With Matsuzaka anchoring the rotation, every other starter will move back one slot. Curt Schilling is a solid #2 starter; Jonathan Papelbon, if healthy, is likely to be an excellent #3; Josh Beckett will probably at least be a solid #4; Tim Wakefield is a serviceable #5. The Red Sox’s rotation, previously a question mark, will have morphed into a legitimate strength, with the potential of being the best staff in the AL.

Furthermore, Matsuzaka is only 26 years old. While his arm has already logged many innings in Japan (apparently, rumors of his 250-pitch complete game as an 18-year-old are true), he has also never broken down. Additionally, scouts are confident that his body-type and work-ethic will allow him to maintain his health, at least for the foreseeable future.

While is seems likely that Matsuzaka will be an excellent starter for at least the next couple of seasons, it still seems unreasonable for the Red Sox (or any team) to spend $100 million on him, especially considering his contract is unlikely to be longer than 5 years. Think about this: if Johan Santana were a free agent, what kind of contract would he expect to receive? Johan has a career 3.20 ERA in over 1,080 innings. He’s struck out more than one batter per inning in his career. He’s won two Cy Young Awards, and should have won a third. He has no injury concerns, and is only 27 years old. Would anyone give Johan a 5-year contract for $100 million? Maybe, maybe not. And Johan is indisputably the best pitcher on the planet (and is a good bet to remain so in the near future).

Thus, if the best pitcher in the world might not receive the same contract that Daisuke Matsuzaka will likely receive, how can the Matsuzaka contract make sense?

Firstly, let’s get one thing straight: the Red Sox are rich. They can cry about the “Evil Empire” as much as they want, and they certainly cannot spend like Steinbrenner’s Yankees, but they are rich. Beyond being rich, however, they are vastly flawed. Their 2006 season was a disappointment, no question, but the Red Sox were not even as good as their 86 wins suggest. Their third-order adjusted standings http://www.baseballprospectus.com/statistics/standings.php suggest that the 2006 Red Sox were “truly” only an 82-win team. Certainly there was bad luck involved---mostly of the injury-related sort---but nonetheless, the Red Sox are very flawed going in 2007 (especially considering the relative strength of the AL in general). However, they lack in any significant bargaining chips (Manny Ramirez is another story) with which to improve themselves via trade. Thus, they must turn to the free agent market. In addition to prices being wildly out of control, there are very few, if any, worthwhile players on the market at just about any price. Forget his $17 million salary---would even a reasonably priced Alfonso Soriano fix the Sox’s problems?

In other words, the only way for the Sox to improve their team going forward is in the free agent market; however, money aside, there are few (if any) logical pieces for them to add. Furthermore, if they’re going to add anyone, they’re going to have to overpay, because of the state of the market. Thus, it becomes apparent that it makes a lot of sense for the Red Sox to guarantee themselves the rights to Matsuzaka. The reason is twofold: A) The Red Sox have to do something, and their only real options are free agents, and B) They’re going to overpay for whomever they get. Thus, for a rich team like the Red Sox, it makes sense that if you’re going to overpay, you might as well get the absolute best available. The marginal increase in dollars spent from an Alfonso Soriano to a Daisuke Matsuzaka is more than made up for by how much each would help the team. Not spending money isn’t an option for the Sox; thus, might as well get the one player on the market who would significantly improve the team.

But wait, there’s more. Matsuzaka is the first Japanese star the Red Sox will have. As such, he will open a revenue stream that was previously unavailable to the Sox. Having a Japanese star will virtually guarantee that every one of Matsuzaka’s starts will be broadcast in Japan, letting the Red Sox generate new revenue from the selling of Japanese advertising. Furthermore, they will expand their market for Red Sox merchandise, as well as increase demand for Red Sox tickets (not that demand was lacking beforehand). All of these are measurable increases in money, of which I’m sure the Red Sox are well aware of the specific projections.

However, what cannot be calculated in dollars is the Red Sox staking their claim in Japan. The Sox, a very progressive and smart organization, will likely use this signing as a way of expanding their entire organization into Asia. They will create many more Red Sox fans and will greatly improve their prospects of landing future Japanese imports. Furthermore, they (correctly) recognize that the game is shifting more and more to the Asian market in general. They want to be at the forefront of this, and the Matsuzaka signing not only symbolically represents this---it also gives the Sox a decided leg-up on the competition in the future.

Oh, and also: they didn’t want the Yankees to sign him.

If Josh Barfield plays poorly, will he earn the nickname "J-Barf"?

Back on November 8, the Cleveland Indians and San Diego Padres made an interesting trade. The Indians sent 3B/1B Kevin Kouzmanoff and reliever Andrew Brown to the Padres in exchange for 2B Josh Barfield. Let’s break down this deal.

THE PLAYERS:

Josh Barfield was drafted out of high school in Texas. He is now 6 feet, 185 pounds. Son of former major leaguer Jesse Barfield, Josh spent 2006 as the Padres regular second baseman, accumulating 539 at-bats over 150 games. Barfield’s line of .280/.318/.423 was solid by any standard, especially for a rookie who played half of his games in PetCo Park. His home/road splits illustrate just how tough a park it is for hitters; Barfield hit .241/.279/.361 at home, but .319/.355/.484 on the road (keep in mind, the NL West has two other parks that are tough on hitters: San Francisco and Los Angeles. Furthermore, Coors Field was not its normal hitter’s haven in 2006). Barfield also hit 13 homers and stole 21 bases in 26 attempts.

Barfield’s line in 2006 is exactly what we would have guessed his rookie season would look like, judging by his minor league number. At AAA in 2005 he hit .310/.370/.450 with 15 homers and 20 steals (in 25 attempts). Thus, while Barfield has only one season’s worth of a “track record” at the major league level, his minor league statistics suggest that 2006 was well within his abilities as a hitter.

Defensively, Barfield used to have the reputation as a rather mediocre defender. However, most reports I’ve read seem to indicate that Barfield has made strides recently, and is now at least average, perhaps slightly above average. He possesses good athleticism and decent range, as well as an excellent arm.

Barfield’s plate discipline has never been a strong suit: last season he struck out 81 times while walking only 30 times. In 2005 in AAA his K/BB ratio was 108/52. However, he’s shown the ability to hit for solid average in the minors---despite being young for his league at every stop along the way, Barfield’s career minor league batting average is exactly .300. While batting average is a fairly volatile and luck-based statistic, Barfield has shown a consistent ability to hit for an above-average batting average.

Kevin Kouzmanoff put up some incredible statistics in 2006 in the minor leagues. However, he it will be tough for him to overcome his legacy of being the first person ever to hit a grand slam on the very first pitch he saw in the major leagues (not that this is something he’d like to forget).

Kouzmanoff, currently 25 years old, was drafted by the Indians in 2003, and he has done nothing but hit since joining the Indians’ organization. When healthy, that is. Various ailments---usually having to do with his back---limited him to 68 games in 2005 and 110 games in 2006. In 2006, Kouzmanoff started the season in AA Akron, where he hit .389/.449/.660 (in a pitcher’s league no less!), earning a promotion to AAA Buffalo. In Buffalo, Kouzmanoff continued raking to the tune of .353/.409/.647. He accumulated 22 homers and 28 doubles in a mere 346 at-bats between the two levels, and had a K/BB ratio of 46/33.

After making an excellent first impression on the very first pitch he saw, Kouzmanoff slumped to .214/.279/.411 in 56 at-bats with the Tribe, and had a recurrence of some of his back issues which cut into his playing time. Kouzmanoff is a third baseman by trade, although the Indians tried him out at first base during the Arizona Fall League this year. According to reports, Kouzmanoff is a decent third baseman, but perhaps not a long-term 3B, and certainly not an above-average defender (some say he’s actually well below average at the hot corner). Although he has hit at every stop in the organization (his career minor league line, in over 1500 at-bats, is .333/.396/.561), he’s also been old for his league at every stop as well.

Andrew Brown has appeared in nine major league games in his career, but has been traded for a major leaguer three times. The Atlanta Braves drafted Brown in 1999 out of high school in Florida. Brown has had injury concerns throughout his career---after appearing in 42 innings as an 18-year-old, he had surgery and missed the entire 2000 season before returning for 62 innings in 2001. The Braves then included him, along with Brian Jordan and Odalis Perez, in a package to the Los Angeles Dodgers in exchange for slugger Gary Sheffield.

Brown made 11 starts as a 21-year-old for the Dodgers in 2002, striking out more than a better an inning, but posting a 4.11 ERA due to walking 4.4 batters per nine innings. However, he once again injured himself, and missed the entire 2003 season (well, he pitched one inning). Paul DePodesta’s Dodgers then included him, along with Franklin Gutierrez, in the deal with Cleveland which sent Milton Bradley to Los Angeles.

Brown spent 2004 as a 23-year-old in AA with Los Angeles and Cleveland. He continued to strike out a lot of batters---125 Ks in 117 innings---but he still walked too many (50) and was surprisingly hittable, leading to ERAs of 4.66 and 4.02.

In 2005 the Indians decided to shift Brown to the bullpen, in order to maximize his value and curtail any future injuries. The result seemed promising: Brown stayed healthy, and had an excellent 81/19 K/BB ratio in 69 innings for AAA Buffalo. His ERA dropped to 3.36.

In 2006, Brown repeated Buffalo, with interesting results. He once again managed to stay healthy, and his ERA dipped all the way down to 2.60. However, his K/BB ratio sunk to 53/36 in 62 innings.

Brown, at 6 feet 6 inches and 230 pounds is an intimidating figure on the mound. For most of his career his fastball came in around 97-98 MPH. However, in 2006 his velocity was down to 94, and his control issues returned.

WHY IT’S A GOOD DEAL FOR CLEVELAND:

The Indians were able to address a gaping hole in their lineup without giving up anyone who figured into their 2007 (or later) plans. Josh Barfield is not only a credible everyday second baseman (with upside well beyond that), but he’s also going to make the minimum salary for another two years, and will not become a free agent for another five years. Cheap players are great; cheap players who are productive are the key to a small market team’s success.

If Barfield mirrors his 2006 statistics he will be an almost-exact replica of Ronnie Belliard during his tenure with the Tribe. However, Barfield is 23, has a track record of success in the minor leagues, and spent 2006 playing half of his games in a hitter’s wasteland. While a sophomore slump (which is just a layman’s term for “regression to the mean”) is not out of the question, Barfield is likely to maintain his production, and has a significant chance of improving.

Furthermore, while Brown and Kouzmanoff could very well end up being good players, neither was going to get a chance to play in Cleveland. Kouzmanoff was behind Andy Marte on the 3B depth chart and Ryan Garko on the 1B depth chart---he had more value in a trade than he did to the Indians. The Indians had soured on Brown due to his loss of command and decrease in velocity; plus, Brown was out of options and unlikely to make the team. Rather than risk losing him for nothing (a la Brandon Phillips), the Indians decided to get some value out of him by trading him.

WHY IT’S A GOOD DEAL FOR SAN DIEGO:

The Padres addressed a significant need of their own: third base. Kouzmanoff has proven that he is a legitimate hitter. While he does have decent home run power, he has excellent gap power, a quality which will suit him well in spacious PetCo. The Padres consistently have excellent bullpens, and obtaining guys like Andrew Brown is the exact reason why. For all of his faults, Brown’s upside is significant: it is reasonable to project him as a very solid 7^th or 8^th-inning reliever in the near future. If you collect several guys like Brown, chances are one or two of them will pan out.

However, by filling their void at third base, the Padres have created another at second. While there are several decent veteran fillers on the market (Mark Loretta, Ronnie Belliard, Adam Kennedy), I have to wonder if the downgrade from Barfield to any of the aforementioned veterans will be offset by the upgrade from Russell Branyan to Kevin Kouzmanoff at third base. Yes, Kouz has hit at every level, but he’s not a very good third baseman, and has lingering injury concerns. Furthermore, much of his value is against left-handed pitchers (whom he CRUSHED in 2006, hitting .436 against them in AA and a ridiculous .500 in AAA), and he is far less proven (and is also older) than Josh Barfield.

CONCLUSION:

Overall, it’s a good deal for both teams. However, there are many more questions as to the Padres’ motivation than the Indians’. In the end, though, I remember something I read in an interview with Atlanta Braves GM John Schuerholz.

“My view [on trades] is that when you make a deal, the most important thing is to make your team better. The next most important thing is to make the other team better...because if you do that often enough, there's going to be a lot of guys lined up to do a deal with you.”

No Morneau!

If you read any relatively enlightened baseball analysts---such as ESPN's Rob Neyer or Keith Law, or Rotoworld---you will probably have heard the arguments as to why Justin Morneau is such a poor choice for the AL MVP.

And, needless to say, I agree. My argument for why this is so would not differ much from any of the aforementioned people's argument. He was the third best player on his own team, let alone less of a valuable commodity than many other AL players.

The question is, should we even care anymore? Many people fret about these awards, even though they really do not mean much---players would probably gladly trade them for team achievements, and they have no lasting impact on much of anything. Yet, personally I always hope the "best" candidate wins, or at least one of the best (Albert Pujols was a more deserving candidate than Ryan Howard, but at least Howard was fairly deserving too).

I think Rob Neyer said it best in his ESPN chat today: "The up-side is that there's clearly still plenty of room in my business for young men who enjoy facts."

Whenever I get discouraged because I think baseball has evolved enough that people with my viewpoint are already very prevalent, I can remember that Justin Morneau was voted as the 2006 American League MVP.

Juan and only

What do Luke Scott, Josh Bard, Mark Teahen, Josh Willingham, Rich Aurilia, Esteban German, Kenny Lofton, Wes Helms, Chris Duncan, Jose Valentin, David DeJesus, David Ross, Brandon Phillips, Mark DeRosa, Casey Blake, Greg Norton, Emil Brown, Ty Wigginton, Marcus Thames, Ryan Theriot, Andre Eithier, Aaron Hill, Ryan Church, Jose Lopez, Jamey Carroll, Stephen Drew, and Mark Grudzielanek all have in common?

They are part of the group of 141 major league baseball players who had a higher VORP in 2006 than Juan Pierre (and keep in mind that VORP takes into consideration at-bats).

You might think that this is a fluke. Perhaps Pierre had an unusually poor season. Let’s see.

First of all, he was playing for the Chicago Cubs, who play in a pretty good hitter’s park. He hit .292/.330/.388, stole 58 bases and was successful in 74% of his base-stealing attempts. His career line is .303/.350/.377, with a SB success rate of 73.6%. It would appear that Juan Pierre, in 2006, had a very Juan Pierre-like season.

Thus, the Los Angeles Dodgers have decided that the approximately 142^nd-best player in major league baseball is worth $45 million to them over 5 years. Pierre is going to be 30 years old in August. Accordingly, not only is he unlikely to improve, he’s also likely to begin his decline during the contract. His 2004 line of .327/.374/.407 is looking more and more like a career year. Furthermore, he will be going from Wrigley to Dodger Stadium, which will not help his batting average. Without a solid batting average, Pierre is an even worse player, considering he doesn’t walk much and has zero power. Pierre is generally considered an average defender in center, nothing special, but nothing wrong with him either. Will this still be the case three or four years into his contract?

After losing JD Drew, the Dodgers have, in essence, “replaced” his contributions to the team with Juan Pierre, a FAR inferior player, for a similar cost (and more years). For those wondering, Drew was 59^th in VORP in 2006.

It remains to be seen whether the strong farm system that Ned Colletti inherited (thanks to Logan White) and solid core of players including Brad Penny, Derek Lowe (thanks to Paul DePodesta) will catapult the Dodgers into success, or whether Colletti’s valiant attempts at dragging them down into mediocrity will overcome their surplus of excellent young players.

Desperation is a poor quality for a decision-maker

Desperation can cause men to make some crazy decisions.

Witness the case of Cubs General Manager Jim Hendry.

For all intensive purposes, if the Cubs do not succeed in 2007, Hendry will likely be jobless. Thus, his thought process has less to do with the overall success of the franchise in the long-term, and more to do with making sure the team is competitive in 2007. This is no small task, considering his Cubs won a mere 66 games in the weakest division in baseball.

Alfonso Soriano, while certainly a good baseball player, is also an incredibly overrated player. I will give credit where it’s due: in 2006, playing in an extreme pitcher’s park, Soriano was incredible. He had a career high in homers (46), walks (67), OBP (.351) and SLG (.560). He stole 41 bases (although was caught 17 times), and played an acceptable left field (but don’t let the outfield assists fool you---everyone was testing him, so it makes sense for him to accumulate a lot of assists).

However, one season does not a player make. Soriano is 30 years old, in the middle of his prime, and unlikely to improve much more. He is, however, likely to decline with age. Furthermore, 2006 has all of the makings of a career year. His career OBP is a lowly .325. With Texas in 2004 and 2005, he was downright abysmal away from Arlington, posting a line of .224/.265/.374 in 2005. Lest you think this was a fluke, his 2004 road numbers are very similar: .244/.291/.444.

Thus, not considering the length of the contract, Soriano is unlikely to be that good even while he remains in his prime. Plus, when you consider the fact that he will be under contract, at $17 mil per season, for eight seasons…well, it makes you glad that you’re not a fan of the Lovable Losers.

On the plus side for the Cubs, it looks as if they intend on making Soriano a center fielder. Assuming he can do an adequate job, this will maximize his value, as it is a lot harder to find solid-hitting center fielders than it is to find solid-hitting corner outfielders. However, if the Cubs decide that Soriano is better suited to left, he will doubly hurt them, as he will likely take at-bats away from the underrated Matt Murton.

The Cubs will have a formidable lineup in 2007, and it’s not like they’re a poor team financially. They should at least contend, which is not saying much considering the weakness of the division. However, given the Cubs’ financial might, it seems that they could have improved themselves just as much (if not more) than by taking the huge financial risk of signing Alfonso Soriano.

Especially since he’s really not that good in the first place.

I'm back, and ready to write!

After a brief (okay, prolonged) absence, I am back and hoping to update this blog fairly regularly now. Luckily for me, it looks as if baseball is going to give me a lot to discuss and dissect, in addition to the multitude of moves that have already occurred during this off-season.

I hope to take an in-depth look at the Cleveland Indians, my favorite team, but I am more of a BASEBALL fan than a CLEVELAND fan. As such, I will often detour to discuss recent transactions made by other teams, or other random thoughts, anecdotes, and ideas that enter in to my head.

As you will likely see upon reading my ramblings, I take a very sabermetric approach to my studies of baseball. This is not to say that I believe statistics are the be-all and end-all of baseball analysis---they're absolutely not. I'm sure that one of my later entries will revolve around my frustration about the misinterpretation of the sabermetric Bible, "Moneyball," as well as the portrayal that sabermetric geeks like myself often receive (I have no problem with the term "geek"---I most certainly am one---but my beliefs about and attitudes towards baseball are often misrepresented.)

As a final note to my new "first entry" (the only reason I did not create a new blog is because I could not think of an appropriately clever name that is better than "Tribe Scribe"---I'm sure in time I will do so, and then I will likely create a new blog. Suggestions are welcomed.), I would like to give you some details of my background. As there is no way for me to "prove" these details, I will take a page out of Jack Bauer's book and say that you're just going to have to trust me.

I am currently a college student, studying at Tufts University and currently spending a year abroad in London. I have worked and interned for the Cleveland Indians and Tampa Bay Devil Rays, although not (yet) in a baseball operations department. At Tufts, I founded the nation's first (we think) baseball-analysis club, called BAT (Baseball Analysis at Tufts, clever name I know). In our first year, we brought in such speakers as New York Times columnist and Baseball America writer (and ESPN contributor) Alan Schwarz; Boston sportswriters Chris Snow, Gordon Edes, and John Tomase; ESPN contributor and Providence Journal reporter Sean McAdam, and more. We also we fortunate enough to have the god-father of (and the man who coined the term) sabermetrics, Bill James, come to Tufts as well.

I, along with a fellow Tufts student, conducted a research project about then-Braves and current-Orioles pitching coach Leo Mazzone, investigating whether or not his reputation as a premier pitching coach was justified. The short version of our findings (which were highlighted later in the New York Times) is that indeed Mazzone significantly improved Braves’ pitchers during his tenure with Atlanta (lest you think his brilliance has more to do with having quality pitchers and less to do with his teachings, we adjusted for age of pitchers, and compared pitchers only to themselves, thereby negating any advantage Mazzone might have had for working with top-flight pitchers such as Greg Maddux and Tom Glavine). We conducted the same analysis on other pitching coaches with similar reputations---Johnny Sain (Mazzone’s teacher), Dave Duncan, Mel Stottlemyre, and Rick Peterson. Interestingly, none of these man’s performance was even close to that of Mazzone’s, and only Stottlemyre could boast even a small improvement for his pitchers.

I was also fortunate enough to present our findings at the 2005 SABR Convention in Toronto, where I met such “celebrities” as Bill James, Rob Neyer, and Gary Gillette. If you are interested in reading more about, please click here or here.

I hope you enjoy my blog, and please feel free to leave comments or e-mail me, at peterabendix@gmail.com.