Examining the Tribe's hitters' BABIP: Team and individual

Last season, the Indians’ batting average on balls in play (BABIP) as a team was .327. The American League average for BABIP was .308; no other team was even higher than .319. In other words, the Indians were extremely lucky in BABIP last season. Nearly every single player who had a significant amount of plate appearances posted a BABIP better than league average---in fact, of players with at least 100 PAs, only Aaron Boone (.288), Eduardo Perez (.275), Todd Hollansworth (.265), and Andy Marte (.265) were below average. That means that Choo (.412), Shoppach (.387), Broussard (.371), Martinez (.345), Inglett (.344), Sizemore (.342), Gutierrez (.336), Luna (.333), Garko (.333), Peralta (.329), Hafner (.326), Blake (.325), Michaels (.320), and Belliard (.317) ALL had above-average BABIPs last season.

However, before we get too worried that many of the Tribe’s hitters were extraordinarily lucky last season, let’s take each’s BABIP in the context of the individual hitter. For hitters, BABIP does not hover around .300 in the same way it does for pitchers---generally, some hitters have higher or lower BABIPs. The key in judging “luck” for hitters is to look at other factors---ground-ball/fly-ball ratio, line drive percentage, and BABIP in other seasons---to try to find aberrations.

Because they have limited major league experience, we have little with which to judge Choo, Shoppach, Inglett, Gutierrrez, Luna, and Garko. Likely most of them were fairly lucky (especially Choo and Shoppach), but it’s possible some of their BABIPs were legitimate. Ben Broussard seems like a clear-cut case of being lucky---his previous season’s BABIPs were .320 and .287; his BABIP with Seattle after the trade was .279. I’m most interested in the players who will have a significant role with the Tribe next season, namely Sizemore, Martinez, Peralta, Hafner, Blake, and Michaels.

Let’s start with Grady Sizemore. Before I get into the details, I would like to stipulate that I’m a huge Grady Sizemore fan. I think his excellent 2006 is just the tip of the iceberg, and Sizemore has a chance to be a very special player.

However, it would appear that Sizemore received an inordinate amount of luck in 2006.

In 2006, Grady Sizemore hit the ball in the air, a lot. In fact, 46.9% of his balls in play were fly balls, compared to 31.2% in 2005. This is excellent for hitting for power---ground balls cannot possibly become homers, and rarely become doubles or triples. However, while fly balls are more likely to be extra-base hits, they’re also more likely to be outs, generally. Sizemore also had a lower line-drive percentage in 2006 than he did in 2005; in 2006 19.8% of his balls in play were line drives, versus 24.3% in 2005. Line drives, as you might imagine, are more likely to become hits than regular fly balls---in fact, line drives become hits approximately 75% of the time. So Sizemore hit more balls in the air (which are more likely to become outs), but a lower percentage of line drives. And yet, Sizemore’s BABIP increased from .335 in 2005 to .342 in 2006. Yes he’s fast, but speed has little influence in whether fly balls or line drives fall for singles or are caught for outs.

Sizemore’s increased fly-ball percentage bodes well for his power---his homer total increased in 2006 despite Sizemore having fewer of his fly balls become homers than in 2005 (only 12% of his fly balls in 2006 became homers, versus 15.1% in 2005). However, coupled with his drop in line-drive percentage, it does not bode well for Sizemore’s batting average. More fly balls means more extra-base hits and more outs.

Of course, Sizemore still strikes out a lot---20.4% of his plate appearances in 2006 ended with a strikeout, in 2005 it was 18.7%. However, his minor league track record suggests that this is something he can improve on---as a 22-year-old in AAA he struck out in only 15.2% of his plate appearances, and as a 21-year-old in AA only 13% of his plate appearances ended in a strikeout. Thus, Sizemore can negate the likely regression in his batting average by simply putting the ball in play more often, and his track record suggests he is capable of making this adjustment.

Furthermore, Sizemore could once again improve his line-drive percentage. If Sizemore improves his line-drive percentage and maintains his fly-ball percentage, his batting average would likely stay around .290 while his power numbers continued to increase. If he can strike out less, too, there’s no telling how good he can be as soon as next year. However, in 2006, he was a little lucky.

Victor Martinez does not have the benefit of relying on his fleet feet. His BABIP rose for the second consecutive year, from .290 in 2004 to .327 in 2005 and .345 last year (incidentally, his batting average has followed suit, from .283 to .305 and .316). However, Martinez’s line-drive percentage has also risen each season, from 16.8% to 20.6% and finally 21.6%. His strikeout rate has remained stable, around 12%, and his walk rate has also remained stable, around 10%. Martinez has been remarkably consistent over the last three years, except each season he’s hitting the ball harder. It’s likely a .345 BABIP still has some luck, but it upon examining these other factors, it may very well be legitimate. (Incidentally, Martinez hit 34.4% of his balls in the air last season, up from 31.8% the year before. However, only 9.4% of his fly balls became homers, down from 14.4% and 12.6% the previous two seasons. It’s possible that Martinez’s power numbers will spike next year; if healthy, 25 homers is not out of the question).

Time will tell if Jhonny Peralta’s 2005 season was a career year. Remarkably, his 2005 and 2006 seasons do not look that different---his ground-ball rate remained fairly steady (45.5% in 2005, 47.6% in 2006). His line drive percentage was also consistent, 19.5% in 2005 and 18.8% in 2006. Peralta’s 2005 BABIP was an exceptionally high .349, but his 2006 BABIP was .329, also fairly high. So what changed?

Well, Peralta walked less, struck out more, and had over 10% less of his fly balls become homers. Peralta’s walk rate fell from 10.2% to 8.9% of his plate appearances, while his strikeout rate rose from 22.5% to 24.1% of his PA. In 2005, 19.6% of his fly balls became homers, whereas in 2006 only 9.4% of his fly balls became homers.

While this is tough to read, it appears to suggest that the “real” Jhonny Peralta lies in the middle. His ground-ball and line drive percentage didn’t change much; and while his walk rate fell and strikeout rate rose, neither changed by a hugely significant amount. In 2005 an inordinately high amount of his fly balls became homers; in 2006, an inordinately low amount became homers. It is likely that Peralta will improve a fair amount upon his production in 2006, but not nearly to the level of his production of 2005.

When you look at Travis Hafner’s numbers, you begin to realize how amazing he is. When you look deeper at Hafner’s numbers, you realize that he’s even better than you thought. Interestingly Hafner’s walk rates have increased from 2004 to 2006 (11.8% to 13.7% to 17.7%) while his strikeout rates have been relatively stable (19.3% to 21.3% to 19.6%). His line-drive percentages have gone up every year since 2004 as well, from 18.6% to 20.2% and then 21.2%. His home-run rate has gone up each season as well, from 4.9% of his plate appearances to 5.7% and then 7.4%. This has coincided with an increase in the percentage of fly balls that become homers, from 18.6% to 26.8% to 30.7% However, Hafner’s BABIP has gone down each season, from .356 to .349 and then .326. In 2004 43.5% of his balls in play were fly balls; that number fell to 36.5% in 2005 and went back up to 40.2% in 2006.

That’s a lot of numbers. What it suggests is this: Hafner is striking out the same amount, walking more, and hitting the ball harder. However, his BABIP has gone down, dropping 23 points from 2005 to 2006. It is likely that not as many of his fly balls will become homers next season (he led the entire AL in this category, by a whopping 4.1% over the second place man, David Ortiz). However, it is also likely that more of Hafner’s balls in play will become hits, suggesting that a rise in his consistent batting average (.311, .305, and .308 the last three years) could be in store, which when coupled with his consistently improving walk rate should boost his already-amazing OBP even more. As a side note, Hafner played in only 129 games last year and yet hit 42 homers; if his homer rate does go down somewhat but his health allows him to play 150 games, it’s quite likely that he’ll still surpass his 2006 homer total.

Casey Blake was essentially the same player in 2006 that he was in 2004. His walk rate was about the same (10.2% and 9.9%), his strikeout rate was nearly identical (20.8% and 20.4%), his home run rate was virtually unchanged (4.1% and 4.2%). In that pesky 2005 season, Blake struck out the same amount (19.9), but walked less (7.4%) and homered less (3.9%). His BABIP in 2005 was also significantly lower than in 2004 or 2006---in 2004 it was .312, then .268 in 2005, and .325 in 2006. Interestingly, in 2004 39.8% of his balls in play were fly balls; this spiked to 42.4% in 2005, and then fell back to 36.6% in 2006.

In the past three seasons, we’ve seen two Good Casey Blakes who were virtually identical, and one Bad Casey Blake who was less patient, less powerful, and less lucky. It’s looking like the 2005 version was more of an aberration; however, next year Blake will be 34 and could begin to decline. It’s reasonable to expect some slippage from Good Casey Blake, but probably not to the level of Bad Casey Blake.

Jason Michaels had never been an every-day player before 2006; thus, we must take a comparison of his 2006 season to the previous two seasons with a grain (or ten) of salt. That being said, Michaels’s ground-drive percentage has remained consistent since 2004 (40.0%, 40.7%, and 39.6%). His line-drive percentage has fluctuated but remained in the same range, from 20.5% in 2004 to 24.6% in 2005 and 22.7% in 2006. His BABIP was .345 in 2004 and .350 in 2005, but fell to .320 in 2006. What changed?

Well, Michaels did. Or perhaps he was exposed because of playing every day. Either way, he walked significantly less than he had in previous years (12.1% in 2004, 12.8% in 2005, and 7.8% in 2006). His strikeout rate was smack in between his previous two seasons’ (23.1% in 2004, 13.1% in 2005, and 18.4% in 2006).

Despite maintaining a similar ground-ball and line-drive percentage, Michaels walked significantly less and had a much lower BABIP. Much of this can be attributed to the fact that he was exposed to many more right-handed pitchers than he had been in the past; perhaps accounting for the fall in the walk rate. However, it would appear that the decrease in BABIP has more to do with bad luck than it does playing every-day, considering his line-drive percentage remained stable. Hopefully facing more lefties will cause him to find his old patient ways; this, combined with some regression on balls in play would make Michaels’s OBP above-average and make up for his lack of power.

On a team-wide level, the Indians’ BABIP of .327 is extremely high---as I said earlier, it is much higher than any other major league team. Thus, it is quite likely that a lot of this has to do with luck---lots of balls that the Indians were putting in play were simply evading fielders. However, we should remember that the Indians have some excellent hitters who hit the ball hard when they put it in play, thus increasing the chance that the ball will become a hit. Their team line-drive percentage was .207, second in baseball behind Minnesota (.214) and just ahead of the White Sox (.201), Boston and Texas (.200 each). In other words, a high team BABIP is to be expected, but the Indians’ BABIP was still higher than normal, even given their line-drive percentages.

The Indians are very likely to experience some regression in their BABIP as a team. Hopefully, this will be made up for by increased power, especially from Sizemore, Peralta, Martinez, Marte, and left-field platoon of Michaels and Dellucci. The Indians will not have problems scoring runs, but they will probably not experience the same amount of luck on balls in play that they experienced in 2006.

I will be out of town for a couple of weeks, and will not post again until 2007. Happy Holidays everyone!

Playing the odds

Nothing in baseball is certain---that’s what makes the sport so fascinating. However, in the course of my writing and discussing baseball, I tend to make statements which sound a lot like certainties. For example, I’m confident that the Indians are going to be a very good team next year, and could win the Central Division. This is far from a certainty, of course. My purpose in making this statement is twofold: 1) I think the Indians are going to be better than most people expect them to be, and 2) I think they have an excellent chance of winning the division, or winning 90+ games, or whatever other standard you choose to invoke. By no means is this a guarantee; in fact, the odds that they will not win the division are pretty high. I acknowledge this in making the statement, and I make the statement anyway. When I make statements of prediction such as this one, I do so with the understanding that there’s a good chance that I’m wrong, however THERE’S A MUCH BETTER CHANCE THAT I’M RIGHT.

Take, for another example, a list of players that I was very high on entering the 2006 season. By “high on,” I mean I expected these players to improve a lot and/or play produce a lot better than they had in the previous season---from a fantasy baseball perspective, I thought these guys were undervalued:

CC Sabathia

Brandon Webb

Felix Hernandez

Jake Peavy

Grady Sizemore

Jeremy Bonderman

Javier Vazquez

Jake Westbrook

Vernon Wells

Ramon Hernandez

Jonny Gomes

Matt Holliday

Ryan Howard

To be sure, I was wrong on a fair amount of players---namely Hernandez, Peavy, Vazquez, and Gomes from that list. I spoke with the same amount of “certainty” about King Felix dominating the league or Javy Vazquez reverting to his Montreal-form that I did about CC and B-Webb being on the brink of stardom. That’s because in each of my assessments, there’s a good chance that I’ll be wrong---however, with enough assessments of, say, a 70% chance of being right, I’ll have a competitive advantage (for the purposes of fantasy baseball) over others. My being wrong about Peavy does not negate the thought-process behind it, when that thought-process produced many correct results.

Even now I feel I must add another qualification: I do not necessarily believe my way of thinking is the best way to analyze baseball. To my current knowledge, I believe it’s the best way, as well as the most accurate way someone in my position can analyze and predict. The more data you have access to, the more knowledge you accrue, the more you learn about different aspects of the game, the better you will be as an analyst. As such, I have limited baseball experience---no scouting experience with only a modest understanding of scouting----and I have access only to publicly-available statistics and information. Furthermore, I have the constraints of analyzing baseball as a hobby rather than a profession (something I hope will change in the future), meaning I am not able to dedicate as much time to it as I would like. Moreoever, I know I have much to learn about statistical analysis in addition to the vast arrays of knowledge one can acquire simply by working in or playing baseball.

That being said, I am going to continue believing what I believe until someone shows me that I am wrong, or shows me that there’s a better alternative. This does not mean I’m close-minded; just the opposite: I am always on the lookout for new ideas, and I am especially intrigued if these new ideas run contrary to what I currently believe. Does Chien-Ming Wang represent a new way of succeeding as a major league pitcher? What can we learn from examining Wang? I hope to acquire additional information all the time; occasionally, it supplants my old beliefs, but usually it supplements these beliefs and sometimes reinforces them.

What I am humbly trying to say is this: I recognize all that I do not know. I want to learn more, to understand better, and to improve. This is a continual goal for me. In the meantime, I will use the current knowledge I have to the best of my abilities when analyzing the game of baseball. My being wrong could constitute an incorrect method or misunderstood beliefs; however, my being wrong could also simply represent the relative chance of being wrong in any one instance, given the luck and variation involved with the sport. That’s why baseball is my passion: because, as Yogi Berra said, “in baseball, you don’t know nothing.” And there’s so much to learn.

The Other Chris Young

After the 2005 season, Javier Vazquez demanded a trade out of Arizona. Vazquez wanted to be closer to his family, who lived on the east coast. The Diamondbacks obliged, as they were required to do, and dealt Vazquez to the White Sox in exchange for Orlando Hernandez, Luiz Vizcaino, and minor leaguer Chris Young.

Why should you care? You should care because Chris Young is about to become a superstar.

It’s good to be a baseball player named Chris Young. The other Chris Young (well, the first, the one most people have heard of) is a 6-foot-10 pitcher for the San Diego Padres, who excelled in PetCo Park, unsurprisingly, due to his solid K/BB ratio and his tendency to give up fly balls, which often became outs due to the Padres’ outfield defense, and rarely became homers, due to the Padres’ outfield dimensions. Most people know of Christopher Ryan Young, the pitcher.

However, far fewer people know of Christopher Brandon Young, the outfielder. This Chris Young, set to open the 2007 season as the Diamondbacks’ center fielder, has largely flown under the radar, even among people who closely follow prospects. In order to understand why I’m so high on him for this season and beyond, let’s examine Young’s track record so far.

Young, who will be 23 during the 2007 season, was drafted by the White Sox in the 16^th round of the 2001 draft. He played rookie ball in 2002 and 2003, showing some power and some speed---statistics at such a low level are basically irrelevant. In 2004 he moved up to low-A ball at Kannapolis, posting a line of .262/.362/.505 in 465 at-bats. Young managed 24 homers, 31 doubles, and had 31 steals (in 40 attempts). Young also received excellent ratings in center field---Baseball Prospects rated his CF defense as a +7 for the season. On the down side, Young struck out 145 times---meaning that 43% of the outs he made were strikeouts, an astronomically high number, especially considering he was facing rather unpolished pitchers. However, Young’s combination of speed, power, patience, and defense still made him an intriguing prospect; after all, he was only 20 years old.

There is one interesting element to add to Young’s season at Kannapolis. Young hit 24 homers as a 20-year-old, which is excellent (even with his high strikeout totals). However, according to three-year weighted minor league park factors (http://www.baseballthinkfactory.org/files/oracle/discussion/34611/), Kannapolis was a tough park to hit home runs in: it deflated homers by 24%---the same amount that PetCo Park deflated homers (much to the benefit of Pitcher Chris Young). Basically, had Young played in a neutral park (let alone a park which favored hitters), he could have expected to hit 24% more homers at home, without doing anything differently.

In 2004, the White Sox bumped Young all the way to AA, bypassing high-A ball. Young spent the season with Birmingham, posting a line of .277/.377/.545 in 466 at-bats as a 21-year-old. Young amassed 26 homers, 41 doubles, 32 steals (in 38 attempts), walked four more times than he had in 2003, and struck out 16 less (although Ks still accounted for 38% of his outs). In other words, after a very solid season a Low-A ball in 2003, Young skipped a level, was extremely young for his age, and improved his OBP, SLG, homers, doubles, steals, stolen-base efficiency, walks, and struck out less.

All of this sounds pretty good. Let’s incorporate one additional factor: yes, in 2003 Kannapolis was a tough home ballpark to play in. However, in 2004 Birmingham made Kannapolis look like Coors Field. Birmingham’s home ballpark depressed home runs by a whopping 45%. It’s almost twice as hard to hit a home run in Birmingham’s park than it is in Kannapolis’s home park.

And yet Young, at only 21 years of age, managed 26 homers (in only 126 games). Extended to a full 162-game season of 600 at-bats, that amounts to a total of 33 homers, despite playing half of his games in a park where homers are depressed by 45%.

Had Young played 162 games in a neutral ballpark in 2004 and hit homers at the same pace, he would have amassed over 40 homers, in addition to over 40 steals and excellent patience at the plate.

Yes, Young did not play 162 games, but the idea is that while his AA season was good on the surface, when you consider the circumstances---bypassing High-A ball, being only 21 years old, and playing in such a tough ballpark---it’s an incredible season.

Credit Arizona GM Josh Byrnes with landing such a valuable player in exchange for Vazquez, despite having no choice but to trade Vazquez (additionally, the White Sox paid his entire salary).

In his first season with Arizona, Young suffered a broken wrist in spring training, delaying his start to the season. Once he recovered, Young was sent to AAA Tucson. He played in 100 games for the Sidewinders, totaling 402 at-bats. There was some concern that Young’s injury would have a lingering effect on his bat-speed and thus his power. It’s possible that the injury did affect him, but Young nonetheless once again put up a stellar line of .276/.363/.532 as a 22-year old. He hit 21 homers, 32 doubles, and had 17 steals (in 22 attempts). What’s most interesting about Young’s 2006 season was that he basically eliminated his one weakness: strikeouts.

After striking out 145 and 129 times in the previous two seasons, Young struck out only 72 times in 2006, despite facing AAA pitching. What’s especially impressive is that the decrease in strikeouts did not have any effect on his patience (he still walked 51 times) or his power (57 extra-base hits). Considering that Tucson’s home park is neutral for homers and Young managed “only” 21, it’s possible that his wrist injury was indeed bothering him, and yet he still managed an 895 OPS as a 22-year-old at AAA.

Young was then promoted to the majors and appeared in 29 games, totaling 70 at-bats. He posted a modest line of .243/.308/.386, hitting 2 homers and stealing 2 bases (in 3 attempts). He walked six times (walks accounted for 8% of his plate appearances at the ML level, versus 11% at AAA, 13% at AA, and 12% at A). However, he struck out only 12 times (Ks accounted for only 23% of his outs at the ML level, versus 24% at AAA, 38% at AA and 43% at A).

Young’s defense was also very solid at AAA and earned good reviews at the major league level, allowing him to all-but-secure the CF job in 2007.

Chris Young (the hitter) has put up excellent raw numbers in every season in the minor leagues. His numbers look even better when you factor in that 1) he’s always been young for his league; 2) he’s played in two very tough home parks on hitters; and 3) he’s consistently improved his one weakness, strikeouts, without sacrificing his patience or power.

So what can we expect from Young in 2007 and beyond? Well, PECOTA was high on Young even before the 2006 season---it projected an 852 OPS, 25 homers, and 19 steals for 2007. I imagine the projection will only improve considering how well Young handled AAA pitchers in 2006 (incidentally, the pre-2006 PECOTA had Young’s OPS rising to 924 with 30 homers by 2010). ZIPS’s 2007 projection for Young is an 861 OPS with 29 homers and 15 steals.

Last season, only five major league center fielders managed an OPS of at least 850 (one of them, Gary Matthews Jr., is highly unlikely to match this in 2007). Young’s career OPS in the minors is 859. Furthermore, Young (for a change) will be playing in one of the best hitter’s parks in all of baseball: from 2003-2005, Arizona’s park increased homers and doubles by 14% each; in 2006 it increased homers by 34% and doubles by 10%. Presumably he will also be fully recovered from any lingering ailments related to his wrist injury.

Granted, the major leagues are unlike the minor leagues---Young will be facing the best pitchers day in and day out. However, minor league numbers usually translate very well into the majors, especially for a young player with excellent tools. Chris Young is everything a smart 21^st-century baseball team could ask a prospect to be, and has as good of a chance as anyone in the game to be a legitimate superstar, perhaps as soon as 2007. Soon, that tall pitcher in San Diego will be the other Chris Young.

Major League IV: Seattle Mariners

Bill Bavasi, the General Manager of the Seattle Mariners, must love the movie Major League. Bavasi is obviously attempting to worsen the Mariners in any way possible, in a secret effort to cause the group to unite and prove everyone wrong. If this is not Bavasi’s Master Plan, I have no explanations for why he still has a job.

The Mariners’ two latest moves have been met with a resounding “HUH?!?” by the baseball community, and for good reason. However, these two moves are not the only questionable moves Bavasi has made. Let’s examine.

1) Signing Adrian Beltre. Beltre’s OPSs with the Mariners have been 716 and 792---directly in line with his OPSs in every other season except for 2004. Yes, he was excellent in 2004, but few people believed that Beltre had indeed found a new level of ability. Steroid speculation abounded (fairly or unfairly), but more likely was that Beltre simply had a career year in 2004. It’s sure looking that way now.

2) Keeping Willie Bloomquist on the roster. Perhaps Mike Hargrove is more to blame than Bavasi for this one, but Bavasi deserves some blame. Bloomquist is almost adequate (almost) as a utility defensive replacement; however, there is no excuse for his accumulating exactly 500 at-bats over the last two seasons. His OPSs have been 622 and 619 over those seasons, and it’s not like his defense is the best in baseball. Bloomquist might be a small mistake in terms of wins and losses, but he’s a big mistake in that it was easily avoidable.

3) Signing Carl Everett. Okay, Everett doesn’t believe in dinosaurs. That’d be alright if he could still hit. However, once again against many analysts’ opinions, Everett was signed to DH during the 2006 season. Perhaps Kenny Williams gave him a Darwinian pep-talk before sending him on his way, but Everett ended up hitting .227/.297/.360 line in 308 at-bats as a DH before being cut.

4) Trading Shin-Soo Choo and Asbrudal Cabrera for Ben Broussard and Eduardo Perez. Bavasi acquired the Indians’ first base platoon of Benuardo Perssard in exchange for two AAA minor leaguers. Sure, Choo probably wasn’t a center-fielder and couldn’t hit lefties; but Choo was a solid right-fielder and did destroy righties. Sure, Cabrera was a miserable hitter in 2006, but he was a 20-year-old in AAA, having skipped AA, and profiled to have plus-plus defense at shortstop. Broussard and Perez, meanwhile, were both playing well above their abilities; even if they maintained their pace after the trade, the Mariners were going nowhere fast in 2006 with or without Perssard.

5) Trading Rafael Soriano for Horacio Ramirez. This was a real doozy. How do you think the conversation went with John Schuerholz? “Hey John, this is Bill. How about I give you Rafael Soriano for Adam LaRoche, Andruw Jones, and Tim Hudson. No? Okay, then how about Soriano for Horacio Ramirez.” Rafael Soriano is an extremely dominant reliever when healthy, as evidenced by his 177 strikeouts (and only 53 walks) in 171 major league innings. While injuries are a concern, he appears to have set his arm troubles behind him (for now), and is recovering well from the literal and psychological head injury after getting hit by a Vladimir Guerrero line drive last season. Meanwhile, Ramirez had one span of 9 starts in 2004 where he posted a 2.39 ERA, despite walking 30 and striking out 31 in 60 innings. His career K/BB ratio is 248/200, and he gives up 1.12 homers per nine (65 in 521 innings). And now he’s moving to the American League. It’s not a good idea to trade Rafael Soriano at all; I can’t possibly believe that Bavasi couldn’t have gotten a LOT more if he had looked. Can you imagine what Cleveland, Boston, Florida, or Arizona would have offered for Soriano? Certainly more than Ramirez.

6) Trading Chris Snelling and Emiliano Fruto for Jose Vidro. Bavasi’s latest masterpiece. Jose Vidro was an excellent player in his prime, but he is no longer able to play second base, and his hitting has been in noticeable decline for some years now, with his OPS going from 867 to 821, 763, and 743 since 2003. The Mariners will also be picking up $12 million of the $16 million that Vidro is owed over the next two seasons. It’s bad enough that they’re adding him and paying him $12 million to DH, but they also gave up two potentially valuable pieces. Snelling, a sabermetric favorite, is more fragile than Terrell Owens’s ego, but when he’s healthy he can flat-out hit. Fruto had a 55/21 K/BB ratio in 45 innings in AAA last season, giving up only one homer (and then struck out 34 in 36 major league innings), and throws hard. Vidro is likely to be no better than replacement-level for a DH (if even that “good”), and the Mariners gave up two youngsters with significant upside for the right to pay him $12 million? Ouch.

7) Signing Jose Guillen. Guillen posted a sparkling 674 OPS last season, granted in a pitcher’s park. However, it’s not like Safeco favors hitters. Guillen is going to be 31 years old, and his poor plate discipline suggests that the decline might be real. It’s not like Guillen makes up for his lack of hitting by having a great personality…

8) Signing Miguel Batista. Batista was solid out of the bullpen for Toronto in 2005, posting a 54/27 K/BB ratio. However, the previous season his ERA was 4.80 as a starter and his ratio was 104/96. Sure enough, back in the rotation in 2006 with Arizona, Batista’s ratio was 110/84 in 206 innings. While Arizona’s park favors hitters significantly, such a poor ratio (especially such a poor K rate) does not figure to serve Batista well in the American League.

Sure, it’s easy to second-guess moves in hindsight. The key is looking at whether these moves were seen, at the time, to be mistakes. If they were seen to be mistakes, and turned out to be just-as-big of a mistake as most people expected, well…it was a mistake (for example, it’s hard to fault the Red Sox front office for making the Josh Beckett trade---try to find someone who didn’t at the time at least think it was fair for both teams).

For the record, I will give him “credit” for signing Richie Sexson, Jarrod Washburn, and Kenji Johjima. However, it is not full credit or anything close; I still believe that the $88 million spent on Sexson and Washburn could have been spent in a much better way (keep in mind, in the 2004 and 2005 offseasons $88 million could buy a lot more than it does now). Johjima was enough of a no-brainer to take credit away from Bavasi (they had no other plausible options for catcher), and the Ichiro!-effect made it a lot easier for the Mariners to get a deal done. This was no genius on Bavasi’s part.

The Mariners won’t be awful in 2007; however, with better management they would likely to be able to compete for what’s expected to be a relatively weak Western Division. King Felix can only take them so far.

Getting defensive

Defensive Efficiency Rating (DER) measures the percentage of balls in play that are converted into outs by a team’s defense. The better the defense, the higher the team’s DER, and the lower their batting average on balls in play (BABIP) against. DER + BABIP = 1.

In 2006, the Indians were 25^th in baseball, posting a DER of .686---meaning their BABIP was a very high .314 (remember, league average is generally around .300). This would explain a lot of their pitching problems in 2006, especially considering that they were 29^th in pitching strikeouts (only the Royals had fewer). So the Tribe had a ton of balls in play and an inordinate amount of them became hits. That’s not a good recipe for success.

However, in 2005, the Indians ranked 3^rd in DER, at .720 (meaning their BABIP was .280). Their 2005 pitching staff was pretty similar to their 2006 staff; more importantly, their 2005 and 2006 defenses were very similar.

Grady Sizemore (CF), Casey Blake (RF), Jhonny Peralta (SS), Ronnie Belliard (2B), Aaron Boone (3B), and Victor Martinez (C) played most of both seasons at their respective positions. The main change came in left field, where Jason Michaels replaced Coco Crisp; however, Michaels was a centerfielder by trade and had a reputation of being a solid defender. So what happened to raise the Indians’ BABIP from .280 to .314 in one season with basically the same defense?

Well, there are a couple of possibilities: 1) the pitching staff got tremendously worse; or 2) the defenders simply did not perform as well.

Let’s examine the first idea first. Surely, the Indians’ pitching was not nearly as good in 2006 as it was in 2005. In 2006, their staff ranked 6^th in the AL with a 4.41 ERA. The starters were 3^rd in the league with a 4.31 ERA, but the relievers (as you likely know) were awful, finishing 11^th in the AL with a 4.66 ERA.

In 2005, the Tribe was tied for first in the AL with a 3.61 ERA. Their starters were 5^th, with a 3.96 ERA, and their bullpen was 1^st, with a 2.80 ERA. Despite Kevin Millwood’s departure and Jason Johnson’s awful stint in 2006, the Indians’ starters remained very good, thanks to CC Sabathia’s improvement, Jake Westbrook’s regression to the mean (in a good way), and Jeremy Sowers’s strong performance.

The bullpen was definitely a lot worse. However, “worse” does not necessarily equal giving up more hits on balls in play; as we know, generally this is a luck-based statistic. Therefore, while the bullpen was definitely worse, this does not account for the change in BABIP from 2005 to 2006.

More likely, it would seem that the Indians’s defense in 2006 was a lot worse than their defense in 2005. If this is true, we’d expect to see a significant difference in the BABIP’s of pitchers who were on both the 2005 and 2006 staffs. Let’s see:

(2005 BABIP is listed first, then 2006 BABIP)

CC Sabathia: 284-291

Jake Westbrook: 287-322

Cliff Lee: 277-296

Bob Wickman: 269-292

Rafael Betancourt: 294-273

Jason Davis: 325-345

Fernando Cabrera: 277-293

As you can see, of the pitchers who logged a significant amount of innings in front of both defenses, only one (Betancourt) had a better BABIP in 2006. It looks as if there was a significant difference in defense.

How did the defense get that much worse? Two reasons: 1) many of the players performed a lot worse in 2006 than they did in 2005; and 2) Coco Crisp performed much better in 2005 than Jason Michaels did in 2006. Let’s evaluate.

Baseball Prospectus offers a defensive stat called Fielding Runs Above Replacement (FRAR). This is defined as “A fielding statistic, where a replacement player is meant to be approximately equal to the lowest-ranking player at that position, fielding wise, in the majors. Average players at different positions have different FRAR values, which depend on the defensive value of the position; an average shortstop has more FRAR than an average left fielder.” Thus, it is important not to compare the FRAR of two different positions, but it can be important to compare two different players at the same position.

We can look at FRAR and hopefully see what changed in the Tribe’s defense from 2005 to 2006.

I will list the player, their position, their 2005 FRAR, and then their 2006 FRAR

Grady Sizemore (CF): 17-19

Casey Blake (RF): 18-10

Aaron Boone (3B): 15-2

Jhonny Peralta (SS): 34-46

Ronnie Belliard (2B): 33-15

Ben Broussard (1B): 7-2

Victor Martinez (C): 22-7

Coco Crisp (LF) 2005 only: 22

Jason Michaels (LF) 2005 only: 1

Some other notable numbers:

Andy Marte (3B) 2006 only: 7

Ryan Garko (1B) 2006 only: 1

Josh Barfield (2B) 2005 only: 32

It looks as if Casey Blake, Aaron Boone, Ronnie Belliard, and Victor Martinez suffered considerable declines in their defense from 2005 to 2006 (interestingly, Blake, Boone, and Belliard are all on the wrong side of 30, and Martinez, while only 27, has been catching for awhile). Furthermore, it would appear that the downgrade from Coco Crisp to Jason Michaels was considerable.

So what does this mean going forward? Well, first of all, it is reasonable to assume that, like last year, the Indians won’t walk many batters in 2007 (they finished with the second fewest walks of any team in 2006). Paul Byrd and Jeremy Sowers rely on not walking anyone; CC Sabathia, Cliff Lee, and Jake Westbrook all have very modest walk-rates. No one in the bullpen has huge problems with walking too many batters. On the flip side, only CC has an above-average strikeout rate, while Westbrook, Byrd, and Sowers all strike out very few hitters. Plus, the bullpen has many pitchers who rely on batters putting the ball in play. All in all, the Indians pitching staff can expect a lot of balls to be put in play again next year.

Thus, their defense is going to be extraordinarily important. If the Tribe can curb their apparent bad luck and get back into the top half of DER, their pitching staff should improve tremendously, as they will give up far fewer hits.

Are they likely to improve in 2007? For starters, it’d be tough to get much worse. Even if their defense was legitimately bad, it’s tough to maintain a 14%-below-average rate over two seasons; some regression to the mean is likely due. Furthermore, several of the culprits of poor defense last season---Belliard and Boone---are going to replaced by younger players who are likely to be better defenders (Barfield and Marte). Although Jason Michaels was a poor defender in 2006 for the Tribe in left field, he was quite solid in 2005 for Philadelphia in center field, so there might still be hope for him. Grady Sizemore and Jhonny Peralta actually improved from 2005 to 2006, and the Indians have challenged Peralta to improve his defense even further. Casey Blake is likely on the decline, but his potential replacements, Shin-Soo Choo and Franklin Gutierrez, both have excellent defensive reputations.

The Indians are unlikely to be as bad defensively in 2007 as they were in 2006. If they regress to the mean even a little, they will improve a lot; there remains a chance that not only will the defense improve, but it will be well-above average. Either way, the Tribe’s defense is unlikely to be as big of a liability next year.

A lesson taken to Hart

In the early 1990s, Indians General Manager John Hart acquired many young, talented players, such as Kenny Lofton, Manny Ramirez, Jim Thome, Albert Belle, Sandy Alomar, Carlos Baerga, and more. He then signed them to long-term contracts, guaranteeing the player a good payday in return for a long-term commitment.

Mark Shapiro worked under John Hart, and has taken this lesson to heart (pun intended). Last season, the Indians were, for all intensive purposes, an 89-win team, according to their expected win total. The only players they lost were Aaron Boone, Ronnie Belliard, Bob Wickman, Eduardo Perez, and Ben Broussard---and they received decent returns on Belliard, Wickman, Broussard and Perez in trades.

Thus, the Tribe is left with a very young team that essentially was worth 89 wins last season. The scary thing is, this bunch of Indians is locked up for a LONG time. Here is a list of their roster. Accompanying each player is their (age) in parenthesis, and then the last year they're under contract for. For example:

Grady Sizemore (24) 2012

Means that Grady Sizemore is currently 24 and cannot become a free agent until after the 2012 season. Here's the rest of the team (in alphabetical order, mostly):

Josh Barfield (23) 2011
Rafael Betancourt (31) 2009
*Casey Blake (33) 2007
**Paul Byrd (36) 2007
Fernando Cabrera (25) 2011
Fausto Carmona (23) 2011
Shin-Soo Choo (24) 2012
Jason Davis (26) 2010
David Dellucci (33) 2009
Ryan Garko (25) 2012
Franklin Gutierrez (23) 2012
Travis Hafner (29) 2008
Joe Inglett (28) 2012
Cliff Lee (28) 2010
Hector Luna (26) 2010
Andy Marte (23) 2012
Victor Martinez (27) 2010
Jason Michaels (30) 2007
Jhonny Peralta (24) 2011
CC Sabathia (26) 2009
Kelly Shoppach (26) 2011
Jeremy Sowers (23) 2012
Jake Westbrook (29) 2007
**Joe Borowski/**Aaron Fultz/**Roberto Hernandez are all signed only for 2007

*Arbitration-eligibe after 2007 season
**Club option for 2008

The key thing to note is that while the Indians might have seven free agents after the 2007 season, arguably only one is of any importance (Jake Westbrook), while every single other one is fairly easily replaced. Furthermore, many of these players have club options which would keep them under control for 2008 as well, if exercised. Additionally, none except Westbrook are going to be expensive to retain, should the club want to keep the player. Finally, these seven free agents will clear approximately $24 million off of the books, meaning the team will have $24 million to spend without increasing payroll by one cent.

After 2008, Travis Hafner will be a free agent. However, no one else of the current roster will be a FA. Thus, the Indians should have the financial flexibility to make a very significant offer to keep Hafner.

Notice how many of the Indians' key players---their best players, who are likely to get even better---are signed through 2010 or beyond. Not to mention additional youngsters who are likely to make an impact in 2007 and 2008 (and all of whom will have six years before they're eligible for free agency) such as Adam Miller, Trevor Crowe, Tony Sipp, Chuck Lofgren, and Brian Barton.

The Indians could theoretically go into a shell for three years and maintain a competitive team throughout that span. Of course, they won't, and will likely improve the team during that span. Furthermore, because they haven't handed out any ridiculous contracts this offseason, they are more likely to be able to keep Travis Hafner, one of the few players who would be worth the astronomical amounts of money it would take to keep him around.

Not only are the Indians good, they're also young and they're all going to be around for a long time.

This is just another piece of evidence showing why Mark Shapiro is one of the very best general managers in the game.



Thanks to Rotoworld for their excellent up-to-date salary and contract information.

Dissecting Bullpen Usage

Bullpens are tricky creatures. They're awfully fickle, largely because of the extremely small sample sizes involved, and the self-selection of matchups created by managers. Furthermore, "traditional" stats---even the more advanced ones like K/BB ratio or basic ERA---often don't measure a reliever's true effectiveness. Consider the following scenario:

The Indians lead 3-2 in the 8th inning when CC Sabathia runs out of gas. Eric Wedge leaves him in two batters too many, and Sabathia gives up consecutive line-drive singles to begin the 8th. The opposing team has runners at first and third base, with no outs. Wedge brings in Reliever A.

Reliever A proceeds to give up a fly-out, then gets a ground-ball double play. However, the fly-out just deep enough for the runner at third base to score. The pitcher's raw line looks very good: 1 inning, o runs. Did he do his job?

Yes and no. His ERA will go down. Someone will cite that he has the ability to generate double-play ground-balls. And yet, the game is now tied. It doesn't matter who the tying run is charged to, the thing that matters is that it scored at all.

Thus, bullpens, while certainly fickle, aren't even able to be evaluated easily. Baseball Prospectus has some some excellent advanced statistics which more properly evaluate a reliever's contribution. However, there does not appear to be an easy way to measure or predict the advanced-statistic using traditional stats of any sort. Beyond the pitchers that are obviously very good, there are some that contributed more or less to their team than their raw statistics would suggest.

So how do you maximize your bullpen's effectiveness? What kind of pitcher do you want to bring in the game in the 8th inning of the above example? Intuitively, it makes sense to me that you want a reliever who's going to strike a lot of batters out. While many teams see the value in these types of relievers, I believe they are vastly misused. Here's how:

Using the above example, you want the reliever who you bring into the game in the 8th inning to be able to strike a lot of batters out. You don't just want any kind of out in that situation, you want a strikeout; any other kind of out risks tying the game in the form of a sacrifice fly or the like. Only with a strikeout can you guarantee that the runner from third does not score. Furthermore, because the score is close, the situation is very important, even though it's not the 9th inning. This is the ideal situation where teams should use their "closers" (who tend to be their best reliever, and probably the one most likely to get a strikeout).

Most teams bring in their closers to work the 9th inning. Usually, they bring in the closer when no one is on base, at the beginning of the inning. The closer needs to get three outs, but it does not matter how he gets these outs---in this situation, a strikeout is no more valuable than a ground-out or a fly-out. Thus, it's a waste to use your best strikeout-pitcher in this situation. Furthermore, wouldn't you want your best pitcher in the game when the game is most likely to be won or lost, such as in the situation above? If you choose to "save" your closer for only save situations, you are likely costing yourself some games which are lost prior to becoming save situations in the first place.

The best bullpens are the bullpens that teams stumble on to accidentally. The 2006 Tigers are a perfect example of this. Their closer, Todd Jones, was arguably their third or fourth best reliever, and he did not record many strikeouts. However, he did record outs anyway, and thus earned saves. However, their best relievers---and the relievers most likely to record a strikeout---were the set-up men, led by Joel Zumaya. Zumaya and company oftened preserved precarious leads in the 7th and 8th innings, thus leading to more save opportunities for Jones. Had their roles been reversed, Jones and Zumaya could have had the exact same amount of "personal success," but it would have translated to fewer victories for the Tigers as a team.

My hope is that something similar occurs with the 2007 Indians. I am very high on Fernando Cabrera. Witness his track record:

In his first full season as a reliever, in 2004 with AAA Buffalo, Cabrera pitched 75 innings, posting a 3.38 ERA, while striking out 92 and walking 42 (and giving up only 57 hits). The strikeout and hit rates were very encouraging, the ERA was solid (although remember how this can be misleading) and he walked too many. He also gave up 9 homers.

In 2005, also with Buffalo, Cabrera continued his dominance, and improved his control. He pitched 51 innings, allowing only 36 hits, a mere 3 homers, and struck out 68 while walking only 11. His ERA was 1.23. That's dominance.

With the Indians in 2005, Cabrera struck out 29 in 30 innings and allowed only one homer, posting a 1.47 ERA.

However, in 2006 Cabrera faltered. Despite his struggles---5.19 ERA, 12 homers allowed in only 60 innings---Cabrera's stuff remained in tact, as evidenced by his 72 strikeouts. He walked 32 and gave up 53 hits.

Much of Cabrera's problems were at the beginning of the season, possibly stemming from his participation in the World Baseball Classic.

Cabrera has the stuff and track record to be a very dominant reliever, striking out well more than one batter per inning and giving up few hits. He walks too many, but has shown the ability to improve on that. Furthermore, he's only 24 years old.

Cabrera is the ideal candidate to bring in the above 8th-inning scenario. If the Indians are lucky, Cabrera could be the key cog in a much improved bullpen.

Building a Better Bullpen

The Indians recently signed lefty Aaron Fultz to a one-year, $1.65 million contract, and righty Roberto Hernandez to a one-year deal worth $3.5 million. Both deals include club options for 2008. Reports are also that the Tribe is close to signing Joe Borowski to a one-year deal, with terms currently unknown.

None of these three guys are particularly good, although each has the chance to be pretty decent. However, the key is that every one of these deals is only for one year. When you don't have much money to spend, the best way to minimize your risks is by handing out short-term deals. That way, if the player falls off of the planet before pitching one inning, your losses are minimal, and you maintain enough flexibility to deal with problems that arise in the future.

The Indians' bullpen is a lot better with Borowski, Fultz, and Hernandez in the mix, although there is no guarantee that any of them will duplicate the success they've had recently.

The key for the Indians is regression to the mean...in a good way. Nearly everyone in their 2006 bullpen performed well below their capabilities and track records---especially Rafael Betancourt and Fernando Cabrera. Is it reasonable that both of these pitchers, especially Cabrera, will improve in 2007. Cabrera has a chance to be one of the best relievers in the AL. Furthermore, there are enough live arms in the group that includes Tony Sipp, Ed Mujica, Tom Mastny, Jason Davis, et al that a few of them will have solid years.

Last season a lot went wrong with the bullpen, but the group is a lot more talented than they showed. A little regression to the luck (and maybe even a little good luck, for a change?) and the Indians' bullpen could even be a relative strength in 2007.